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Abstract: 
Capital Requirements have been gaining importance in the current macroeconomic and 
financial environment and Portugal is no exception. Nonetheless, despite the several 
media articles on this subject, the associations with Loan Market Conditions, namely 
availability and pricing are still unstudied. Thus, this project adds to the existing 
literature a characterization of Portuguese four biggest banks on capital reporting and 
requirements fulfillment. It is concluded that banks under analysis need to increase 
capital and that there is an association between the variables under study: Share Capital 
is negatively correlated with Credit Volume, and it is positively correlated with Net 
Commercial Income.   
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1. Introduction  
The capitalization of banks, following Basel III and more recently Troika’s 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), is a subject of major relevance for Portuguese 
Banking System (BS). On June 2011 earnings release
1
, none of the Portuguese 
Financial Institutions (FI) was able to accomplish the announced Capital Requirements, 
which foresees that banks will have to act in order to achieve the required ratios. Indeed, 
due to the higher costs associated with issuing equity rather than debt
2
, FI’ managers 
prefer to hold less equity as possible, implying that the amount of bank equity is 
established by the bank Capital Requirements (Mishkin, 2000). Therefore, the aim of 
this project is to evaluate if banks’ response will transfer the cost of increasing Own 
Funds to customers, through Loan Market Conditions, namely availability and pricing, 
rather than be supported by shareholders, as in a full competitive market. Furthermore, 
despite the alternatives, this project’s focus is made on increasing capital ratios through 
new shares, since this is the alternative that most reflects shareholders’ interests.  
Additionally, this project focuses a hypothetical analysis of banks being required to 
accomplish Capital Requirements on the date of the last available results (June 2011). 
As such, this project consists on evaluating the capital needs of Portuguese FI and on 
the assessment of its associations with Loan Market Conditions. To the best of our 
knowledge, in Portugal, there is still no study regarding Solvency and FI’ needs of 
                                                        
1
According to 2011’s semi-annual results, released by Portuguese Financial Institutions. 
2
Cost of capital is a term used to refer to the cost of a firm’s financing. If computed through the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), it weights both equity and debt on its cost of equity and cost 





capital. Nevertheless, it is undeniable the interest this issue has been raising given the 
current economic and financial environment.  
Regarding the structure of this project, Section 2 presents the definition of key concepts 
and the review of legal framework, while Section 3 presents the review of the literature. 
Section 4 provides the research questions and the methodology used. Section 5 includes 
the discussion of the results. Finally, Section 6 abridges the conclusions, addresses 
contributions to banks’ stakeholders and adds suggestions for possible future research. 
2. Theoretical and Legal Framework 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
This section defines the key concepts relevant for this research. Figure 1 aims to present 
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Capital Requirements are the standardized prerequisites established for FI with 
regards to capital ratios of Own Funds over Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA)
3
. The capital 
ratios defined by Basel Committee are derived from Own Funds’ decomposition: 
Solvency Ratio (Own Funds/RWA), Tier 1 ratio (Tier 1 capital/RWA), Tier 2 ratio (Tier 
2 capital/RWA) and Core Tier 1 ratio (Core Tier 1 capital/RWA).  The main goal for 
imposing a minimum level is to safeguard such institutions from operational losses and 
from increasing the risk of default associated with holding certain investments. To 
accomplish higher Capital Requirements, it is possible to issue extra shares (in order to 
                                                        
3
Risk Weighted Assets measures the amount of a financial institution’s assets, adjusted for risk. 
Figure 1 – Summary of Project and Articulation of Main Concepts 
 5 
raise additional money), to diminish their balance sheets’ size or to decrease their loans’ 
riskiness (Lilico, 2011). The scope of this project is made on the former, meaning that, 
when necessary, it is assumed a non-decreasing RWA. 
Own Funds of a FI shall be the amount of equity like instruments that it is required to 
maintain in order to be able to meet its creditors’ obligations even in the most extreme 
occurrences. Own Funds are equal to the sum of Primary Capital (Tier 1 capital) and 
Complementary Own Funds (Tier 2 capital minus Deductions)
4
. Within Tier 1 capital, 
Core Tier 1 capital has to be referred, since it is the top-quality capital a FI may hold; it 
is mainly constituted by Share Capital and Retained Earnings, whereas Tier 1 capital, 
besides those components, integrates also preferred stocks. A strong and stable bank, 
with an adequate capitalization, should have its Own Funds mainly constituted by Tier 1 
funds. Solvency ratio determines the capacity of an institution to meet its commitments 
over the medium term, reflecting the risk that creditors run, by weighting the 
institution’s Own Funds on its RWA.  
Share Capital corresponds to a company’s total shares that are held by shareholders, 
being the main component of Core Tier 1 capital. Being so, it is the portion of Own 
Funds that better reflects shareholders’ interests, risk and return of agents with control 
over the banks’ strategy. For the purpose of this project, Share Capital Requirements 
refer to the Capital Requirements that entails shareholder to increase Share Capital. 
Loan Market Conditions refers to the price and availability of credit granted by FI. 
The former corresponds to Net Commercial Income
5
 a measure of banks’ profitability, 
which comprises both the net result of interest paid and received and the net result of 
commissions paid and received. In this sense, since banks can directly affect the prices 
                                                        
4
According to Notification 6/2010 issued by the Bank of Portugal (BdP). For a more detailed description 
of Own Funds’ composition, see Appendix 1. 
5
Net Commercial Income may also be referred as commercial margins or price of banking products. 
 6 
supported by customers, in interests and commissions, it can be considered as the best 
proxy to understand the impact on customers and a powerful tool to control 
shareholders’ costs
6
. The later refers to Credit Volume
7
, the amount of loans granted to 
customers. It is expected that when banks are required to raise capital, the credit volume 
decreases (Ackerman, 2011), either because banks desire to decrease their balance 
sheets, either because they aim to diminish the riskiness of their loans and, for that 
reason, are more strict when granting credit to customers. 
Agents (or stakeholders) refer to parties that influence or are influenced by the actions 
of a financial institution. Given the extent of this project, the interest will fall on two 
categories of agents, namely customers and shareholders. The former refers to people 
using banks’ services and consequently are indirectly exposed to changes within the 
bank, such as the accomplishment of Capital Requirements of the Banking International 
Authorities. On the other hand, the later are the ones legally owning part of the financial 
institution and having a residual claim on the firm’s assets. For that reason, are the ones 
exposed to major risks and should be the ones gaining more when FI are performing 
better, as well as the ones incurring in higher losses when FI face more complicated 
situations
8
, as will be the case when dealing with the required capital increases. 
2.2. Regulatory Framework 
The Regulatory Framework described in this section comprehends both Supranational 
and National regulations. 
                                                        
6
The choice for Net Commercial Income rather than Net Income is related to the fact that it is only 
relevant to assess the variables which are associated to the bank core-activity as well as those that may be 
influenced by shareholders. For instance, trading activities are affected by market, not by shareholders. 
7
Credit Volume may also be referred as availability of credit or availability of banking products. 
8
Accordingly to Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), in which potential return augments with 
increasing risk. 
 7 
In order to avoid deficiencies in the financial system, an unstable channel of contagion 
exposed by the global financial crisis, Basel III framework (2010), developed by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, materializes as an improvement of the 
previous Basel I (1988) and Basel II (2004). The different frameworks’ evolution and 
their characteristics is described in Appendix 2. 
Regulators believe that reinforcing banks’ capital, rather than paying out earnings, is the 
right thing to do to build a solid and robust financial system. Yet, this framework is 
being criticized since it might compromise several issues of the economy: the most 
important of all regards the increase of FI’ marginal cost of capital, since banks benefit 
from being highly leverage as they can deduct debt interest. The Institute of 
International Finance goes further and estimates that Basel III’s Capital Requirements 
will lead to the major economies being 3% smaller than they otherwise would be in five 
years and will cost 7.5 million jobs (Elliot, 2010). Different arguments suggest that 
Basel III will destroy any emerging economy recovery. Indeed, some of the critics 
appointed are making success: concerning the liquidity rules, the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis is redefining and adjusting the concept of safe assets (i.e. Greece’s bonds). 
Nonetheless, and accordingly to the Basel Committee, the lower growth rate during 
non-crisis years will be more than offset by a more stable and committed financial 
system, capable of avoiding truly stern recessions during financial crises.  
At a supranational level, it is also important to mention the Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD), officially adopted in June 2006, by the European Parliament and 
Council, which comprises Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC. The former 
regards credit risk, whereas the later determines the rules related to market risk and to 
the supervision of market and operational risks. CRD establishes that FI should disclose 
 8 
the amount of Tier 1 capital resources, Tier 2 capital resources, Tier 3
9
 capital 
resources, separate deductions from Tier 1 and Tier 2 and total Own Funds. Under CRD 
II
10
, an amendment of the previous directive which entered into force in the beginning 
of 2011, the disclosure of additional information is required, namely the amount of Core 
Tier 1 capital, with is composition’s desegregation
11
. 
Not only Supranational regulation influences Capital Requirements, policies and 
information disclosure. Indeed, in the following of the external help request in April 







(Troika), Portuguese FI are also entitled to accomplish additional and more austere 
Capital Requirements. Indeed, banking groups supervised by BdP will have to reach a 




On the other hand, concerning information disclosure, CMVM
16
 plays an important role 
on corporate laws’ supervision and enforcement. CMVM Regulation 1/2010
17
 compels 
companies to deliver a Corporate Governance Report, in which the disclosure of capital 
structure and dividend policy is required; for firms issuing shares, it is also required the 
                                                        
9
Under Basel II, Tier 3 consisted mainly of subordinated debt and undisclosed reserves making part of 
Own Funds’ composition. In the following of Basel III, Tier 3 was extinguished, being Own Funds only 
constituted by Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. 
10
CRD II is composed by Directives 2009/11/EC, 2009/27/EC and 2009/83/EC. 
11
Furthermore, FI are also required to hold minimum reserves by the European Central Bank within the 
framework of the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system. The minimum amount of reserves is 
established in relation to its reserve basis. These requirements aim to stabilize money market interest rates 
as well as create/enlarge a structural liquidity shortage. 
12
International Monetary Fund 
13




 According to BdP’s notificaton 3/2011. 
16
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, which is the Portuguese Stock Market Authority.  
17
For a complete detail of CMVM regulation 1/2010 see Appendix 3. 
 9 
availability of annual reports and accountability documents in the company’s website of 
at least the past five years
18
. 
3. Literature Review  
This section reviews the existing literature on possible associations between Loan 
Market Conditions and Capital Requirements, which is mainly constituted by articles, 
given the raising interest on the topic. On the contrary, given its current relevance, the 
papers regarding the subject are almost inexistent. Studies under review are grouped 
according to some criteria: first, the literature refers to the studies regarding the 
instability of financial markets with its intrinsic exposures and risks of contagion; 
secondly, to those concerning banks inadequate capitalization; and finally, to those 
related to the cost of bank equity and to the advantages and disadvantages of increasing 
FI’ capital ratios.  
FI’ efficiency, particularly banks’, is crucial to maintain the stability of financial 
markets (Berger, 2009). Nonetheless, in a financial system genuinely connected 
throughout an opaque network of financial exposures, where debt is growing at a faster 
pace than equity and leverage is harshly increasing all over the world, even a small 
decrease in asset value can lead to distress and potential in Solvency (Adrian and Shin, 
2009). The financial crisis of the recent years proved that no country is an island. 
Indeed, cross-border capital raisings contributed not only for augmenting the 
economies’ exposure, but also for the risk of contagion, an unknown reality until some 
years ago (Hale, 2011). Nocera (2011) advocates that one possible explanation for this 
crisis relies in the banks’ lack of adequate Capital Requirements and in the holding of so 
much catastrophic debt. In fact, Salmon’s (2010) confirms that, if left to their own 
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According to Decree Law Nr. 35/2005 of the Portuguese Companies Business Law (Código das 
Sociedades Comerciais). 
 10 
judgment, FI will always hold as much debt as possible, as they tend to trust each other 
to a great extent, having faith in being able to exit any given interbank position 
overnight in case of something going wrong. This crisis diverges from such perspective; 
in order to increase banks’ stability, more equity is needed, despite constraining their 
ability to grant loans to the rest of the economy (Ackerman, 2009). 
Nonetheless, Elliot (2010) contradicts this perspective by stating that even a sizeable 
increase of Capital Requirements will imply only a 0.2% increase on the average loan 
pricing. Additionally, Admati et. al. (2010) sustain that bank equity is not expensive: as 
a matter of fact, although equity has a higher required return than debt, using a greater 
proportion of equity will reduce the riskiness of a bank’s equity. These authors also 
support that Capital Requirements do not force banks to stop lending; indeed, they only 
entail banks to fund with a higher proportion of equity, improving the economy, since 
lower leverage banks create better incentives and fewer distortions and, as they state, 
more private ownership of downside risk. Miles (2011) corroborates this perspective, by 
stating that better-capitalized banks are more robust as well as more capable to 
withstand losses on their assets. Moreover, replacing debt with equity can actually be 
much more straightforward than it seems, since holders of existing bank equity and debt 
may desire to preserve the underlying characteristics of their initial portfolios. As a 
result, reallocating the way that risk is borne by different investors need not have any 
direct effects on the overall funding cost of the bank, except if securities are mispriced.  
Regardless of the several perspectives highlighted, it is irrefutable that equity and debt 
do not entail the same cost and, despite all the potential benefits, shifting debt to equity 
always implies incurring in some expenses. Regarding the existing literature, while 
some studies are more descriptive, others present a more detailed analysis; while some 
 11 
stress the quantity (either absolute or relative) of debt held by FI, others focus in the 
cost of financing; finally, while some are national based, others are focused in 
international financial system or in international comparisons. However, and to the 
better of our knowledge, concerning Portuguese BS, despite the existing studies
19
, those 
focusing on Capital Requirements and on the existing relationships between Loan 
Market Conditions and required capital increases are nonexistent. Nonetheless, it is 
undeniable the interest this issue has been rising, especially throughout the current 
worldwide financial crisis and all the Capital Requirements FI have been entailed to 
accomplish. As a result, aiming to fill the existent gap, this project emerges, being the 
first empirical research to study Capital Requirements within the Portuguese BS, 
namely FI’ response regarding Loan Market Conditions when shareholders are required 
to reinforce capital ratios, for the period between June 2004 to June 2011.  
4. Methodology and Data 
This section states the research questions to be answered, discusses methodological 
issues as well as the procedures used to collect data for this project. Finally, it 
characterizes the banks under analysis. 
4.1. Research Questions 
The main purpose of this project is to give a greater insight into the key Portuguese FI, 
perceiving the capital needed to accomplish both Basel and Troika’s requirements and if 
price and availability of banking products is related to capital needs, the Fundamental 
Research Question being as follows: 
Do Loan Market Conditions and Capital Requirements Relate? 
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For instance, BONFIM, Diana, DAI, Qinglei, FRANCO, Francesco, 2010, “Banking relationships and 
financing costs”. 
 12 
In this sense, the first four research questions (RQ) aim to consolidate and gather raw 
data from the reports. Afterwards, the variables will be combined to develop some 
relationships. In order to depict FI, their levels of capitalization and their capital needs 
to accomplish the established requirements, univariate analysis of these variables is 
discussed below. Following a brief characterization of the Portuguese banks under 
analysis, through its Size, Core Profitability and Solvency
20
’s breakdown during the 
period of study (June 2004-June 2011), five questions are addressed, as follows: 
RQ1: What capital ratios are banks disclosing? 
RQ2: Are banks fulfilling Capital Requirements? 
RQ3: Do sources of Own Funds diverge among banks? 
RQ4: How much would be the necessary capital increase of banks to accomplish 
Capital Requirements? 
These four questions serve the purpose of depicting the Portuguese FI. 
Aiming to extend the study and to improve the knowledge on Portuguese FI, bivariate 
analysis is performed: correlation coefficients
21
 are computed in order to verify the 
existence of associations between some variables. The first analysis regards changes in 
Credit Volume and changes in Share Capital, aiming to confirm the existing literature, 
which suggests that Capital Requirements constrains the availability of credit. 
Furthermore, in order to understand the extent to which the price of banking products is 
related to capital increases, it is computed the correlation coefficient between changes in 
Net Commercial Income and changes in Share Capital, suggesting that, if positively 
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For this analysis, Net Assets, Net Commercial Income and Own Funds were considered and maximums, 















 yare the standard deviations. 
 13 
correlated, shareholders are able to transfer part of its costs to customers
22
. As a result, 
two additional research questions which support the fundamental research question are: 
RQ5: Is Credit Volume associated to Share Capital in banks? 
RQ6: Is Net Commercial Income associated to Share Capital in banks? 
4.2. Data 
Out of the 49 banks in the Portuguese FI
23









, the first three being public companies, whereas CGD 
is a State-owned company., The banks’ financial reports were gathered in two sources: 
at the CMVM’s website and at APB’s website and the same information was checked 
for validity purposes
28
. The analysis covers the period between June 2004 and June 
2011, and annual and semi-annual information reported. Bearing in mind the 
unavailable information regarding capital ratios, it was not possible  to extend this study 
to data prior to June 2004. Furthermore, IFRS
29
 accounting standards have only been 
mandatorily implemented in 2005, making backwards data not appropriate for 
comparative purposes.  
This project analyzes the four biggest Portuguese banks. The rationale behind this 
narrowness is that these banks are a good proxy of the Portuguese BS, since they 
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See Appendix 5, for the evolution of Share Capital, Credit Volume and Net Commercial Income. 
23
In December 2010, according to Associação Portuguesa dos Bancos (APB), which is the main body 
representing the Portuguese BS. 
24
Banco Comercial Português, S.A. 
25
Banco Espírito Santo, S.A. 
26
Banco Português de Investimento,  
27
Caixa Geral de Depósitos, S.A. 
28
When collecting the data, a database was created, in Excel format, with the relevant data collected from 
the reports, related to the variables under analysis. This database is a contribution of this research.  
29
International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS) are the guidelines established by the International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB) in order to allow international comparisons between financial 
statements. Concerning the use of IFRS for the Portuguese case, the Decree Law Nr. 35/2005 states that 
all companies listed in a regulated European market will prepare their consolidated accounts according to 
IFRS from 2005 onwards, following EU Regulation 1606/2002. 
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Figure 2 – Net Commercial Income 
Evolution (€M) 
represent the majority of its composition (see the analysis below)
30
. A note should be 
made that the scope of this project focus healthy banks and those capable of issuing 
capital by themselves, meaning that capital increases supported by the Government and 
consequently by taxpayers are not considered. On the other hand, Portuguese BS is not 
considered for the purpose of this study, since one of the goals is to discover and 
analyze possible differences among the different institutions. This section compares the 
composition of the four banks, regarding its Size, Core Profitability and Solvency. 
Regarding size, in 2010, the four banks under 
analysis represent 70.32% of Portuguese BS’s 
net assets
31
, with an average size of €88,797 
M. CGD is the largest financial institution in 
Portugal with net assets amounting to 
€125,862 M in 2010, which corresponds to 
24.92% of Portuguese BS, while BPI is the 
smallest amounting to €45,660 M (9.04%). 
Concerning core profitability
32
, in 2010, the four 
banks correspond to 89.76% of Portuguese 
BS’s Net Commercial Income, with an average 
of €1,767 M. BCP presents the highest results 
with €2,328 M (13.5% of Portuguese BS), 
whereas BPI registers the lower performance 
with €888 M (5.2%). The evolution of this 
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Although being significant within the context of Portuguese BS, Santander was excluded from this 
study, since it is a Spanish bank. 
31
The data concerning Portuguese BS was gathered from APB. The analysis is made for December 2010, 

































indicator differs across different banks: while BES and BPI have been constantly 
presenting higher results, CGD reveals the opposite behavior, with decreasing results.  
With regards to Solvency, in 2010, the four 
banks represent 72.30% of Portuguese BS’s 
Own Funds, with an average of €6,575 M. 
CGD is the bank with the highest Own Funds, 
with €9,226 M (25.8% of Portuguese BS), at 
the same time as BPI presents the smallest 
amount with €2,902 M (7.9%)
33
. Regarding evolution, all banks register a decrease in 
the year 2011, mainly due to the Complementary Own Funds’ decrease. On the 
contrary, BCP is the only one presenting a slightly increase mainly due to the share 
capital increase on April 2011, which amounted to circa €1,350 M. 
From the previous analysis, it is concluded that the four banks differ in Size, Core 
Profitability and Solvency, foreseeing differences among them when dealing with 
Capital Requirements’ accomplishment. 
5. Results 
This section presents the answers to the research questions announced in Section 4.  
Capital Ratios Disclosure (RQ 1) 
Before 2007, FI were not required to disclosure information regarding capital ratios. Although not 
entailed to do so, Portuguese FI disclosed information regarding capital ratios. Essentially, they disclosed 
Own Funds’ desegregation, RWA and the several ratios (Core Tier 1, Tier 1, Tier 2 and Solvency). The 
one disclosing more information is BCP, while, on the contrary, CGD is the one disclosing less, in line 
with the described in Section Two (non-listed companies are not obliged to disclose the same amount of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
32
The operational performance regarding June 2011 was annualized in order to allow comparisons. 
33
These results are in line with the Net Assets’ analysis since the amount of Own Funds is directly related 
to each bank’s size. 
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Table 1 – Capital Ratios by Bank in June 2011  
information). For that reason it does not disclose semi-annual reports from 2006 backwards. After 2007, 
in line with CRD, FI are entailed to do so. From the required capital disclosures, Tier 1 and Own Funds 
are the ones more frequently disclosed (27 compliances against 32 possible
34
): BCP has disclosed this 
information in every period under analysis, BES failed in June2008, BPI in June2007 and CGD failed 
more often (three times: June2007, June2008 and 2008). Tier 2 and Deductions are disclosed 56.3% of 
the times; however Deductions are not disclosed in accordance with CRD, since they are not 
disaggregated between Tier 1 and Tier 2’s deductions. Moreover, there are several cases, with exception 
for CGD, in which banks presents deductions together with Tier 2, also not complying with the European 
Directive. Regarding Tier 3, from 2004 to 2011, no bank complied with this item
35
. From 2011 onwards, 
CRD II is the new directive in force and consequently banks have to disclose additional information 
regarding Core Tier 1 resources and its desegregation. BCP is the only one not disclosing the amount of 
Core Tier 1 capital; it only discloses the Core Tier 1 ratio and CGD only discloses the amount of Core 
Tier 1 resources without detail. From the remaining, BES and BPI are the only ones fully complying with 
this directive. Summing up, Portuguese FI still have to improve the disclosure of information to comply 
with CRD. Nevertheless, there are differences among the four banks, with BPI fulfilling the majority of 
the requirements, and BES fulfilling fewer requirements.  
Capital Requirements Fulfillment (RQ 2) 
The analysis of capital ratios shows that Portuguese FI need to reinforce their capital 
structure. Bearing in mind the Capital Requirements referred in Section 2, if those 
requirements were to be accomplished at the date of the last available results (June 
2011), BCP would be failing both Troika’s Core Tier 1 requirement for December 2011 
(8.50% vs. 9%) and Basel’s 
Solvency for 2013 (10.48% vs. 
10.5%), while BES and CGD would 
be failing Core Tier 1 (8.21% and 8.40%, respectively). Finally BPI, despite being the 
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Between June 2007 and December 2010, there are eight semi-annual periods and since there are four 
banks under analysis, there are 32 possible compliances. 
35
In the following of Basel III, Own Funds are only decomposed in Tier 1, Tier 2 and deductions.  
Ratio Target BCP BES BPI CGD
Core Tier 1 9.00% 8.50% 8.21% 9.10% 8.40%
Tier 1 8.50% 9.31% 9.24% 9.60% 8.56%
Solvency 10.50% 10.48% 11.53% 10.36% 11.53%
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Table 2 – Capital Needs by Bank (€M) in June 2011 
only one fulfilling Core Tier 1 requisite, would not be able to accomplish with Solvency 
ratio (10.36%).  
Main Sources of Own Funds (RQ 3) 
The four banks present Core Tier 1 capital as the majority of its Own Funds’ 
composition, in line with the Capital Requirements’ regulation
36
. Nevertheless, there are 
differences across them. Reinforcing the results of RQ 2, which shows that BPI is the 
only bank fulfilling Troika’s 9% Core Tier 1 requirement for end-of-year 2011, BPI 
also shows the highest proportion of top-quality capital composing its Own Funds, with 
87.8% referring to Core Tier 1 in June 2011. On the opposite side, BES is the one with 
the smallest proportion of Core Tier 1 capital (71.2%), whereas BCP and CGD present 
81.1% and 73.4% respectively. Bearing this in mind, it is anticipated that when banks 
are called to raise capital, they will have to act differently: while BCP, BES and CGD 
will have to care about their Primary Capital, choosing a higher quality form of equity, 
BPI will have to act within their Complementary Own Funds, a much easier task than 
the former. 
Required Capital Increase (RQ 4) 
To find out the necessary amount of 
capital needed to achieve Basel and 
Troika’s directives, a simple exercise was 
made. Assuming that banks would maintain their RWA unchanged
37
, it is computed the 
minimum necessary capital to accomplish with the Capital Requirements. As mentioned 
previously, since Core Tier 1 capital is mainly composed by Share Capital, the capital 
better reflecting shareholders’ interest, what matter for the purpose of this project is to 
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For the complete analysis of Own Funds’ composition of each bank, see Appendix 4. 
37
As mention in the beginning, for the purpose of this work project it is assumed a non-decreasing RWA, 
since the increase of capital ratios is only explored through the improvement of banks’ Own Funds.  
Capital Needs BCP BES BPI CGD
Core Tier 1 292.16 523.44 n.a. 429.08
Tier 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Own Funds 10.02 n.a. 36.29 n.a.
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Table 3 – Correlation Coefficients  
understand the lack of capital regarding Core Tier 1. In line with the previous RQ, 
banks will have to act differently when called to raise capital. Being so, since BES and 
CGD already accomplish Solvency ratio, one possible and efficient strategy is to 
reallocate their Own Funds’ structure, transferring Complementary Own Funds to 
Primary Capital, in a total of €534.44 M and €429.08 M, respectively. On the other 
hand, BCP has firstly to increase its capital, either its Primary Capital or its 
Complementary Own Funds, amounting to €10.02 M, and afterwards reallocate €292.16 
M from Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital in order to achieve the required proportion of top 
quality capital. Finally, since BPI already fulfills Core Tier 1 requirements, shareholders 
will not be affected by the required increase of Complementary Own Funds (of €36.29 
M) to fulfill Solvency Ratio. 
Association between Share Capital and Credit Volume (RQ 5) 
Regarding the availability of credit granted by banks, the results confirm Ackermann’s 
theory that Capital Requirements constrain the credit volume, although this constraint 
diverges among bank. Indeed, while BPI shows almost no correlation, BCP, BES
38
 and 
GCD present negative correlations 
(-39.08%, -4.41% and -17.06%, 
respectively). This may be 
explained by the former’s main 
shareholder
39
 not having faced so restrictive liquidity constrains as the Portuguese. 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume the existence of a negative relationship 
between Credit Volume and Share Capital.  
 
                                                        
38
BES announced an exchange of debt for capital transaction in November 2011, that if considered would 
reinforce the negative correlation result. 
39
BPI’s main shareholder (30.10% of ownership) is Grupo La Caixa, the third largest Spanish bank. 
BCP BES BPI CGD
Share Capital and Credit 
Volume
-39.08% -4.41% -0.38% -17.06%
Share Capital and Net 
Commercial Income
18.50% 25.14% 21.36% -89,94%
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Association between Share Capital and Price of Banking Products (RQ 6)   
The computed correlations (see Table 3) show some association between changes in Net 
Commercial Income and changes in Share Capital: BCP, BES and BPI show positive 
correlations between these two variables (18.50%, 25.14% and 21.36%, respectively), 
suggesting that shareholders are transferring the cost of increasing capital to customers, 
by increasing commercial margins; on the contrary, CGD’s correlation coefficient is 
strongly negative (-89.94%), suggesting that shareholders are supporting the cost of 
increasing capital, which may be explained by the public interests of its shareholder, the 
State.  
 
From the above, it may be concluded that there is an association between Loan Market 
Conditions and Capital Requirements. Regarding availability, customers are granted 
with fewer loans when shareholders are required to raise capital. On the other hand, 
referring to pricing, with CGD being the exception, customers perceive their 
commercial margins to increase. 
6. Conclusion 
This research is a contribution to Portuguese Financial Institutions and to banks’ 
stakeholders, by establishing a starting point for the study of Portuguese banks’ 
Solvency and the impact of Capital Requirements. The aim of this project was to attain 
a greater knowledge on Portuguese banks’ capitalization and on their response to the 
recent increase on capital requirements. Given the financial crisis, the rising interest on 
the subject is evident, namely through the increasing number of articles in worldwide 
press. Nevertheless, still there is a lack of studies regarding banks’ response to Capital 
Requirements, particularly those concerning Portuguese Financial Institutions. 
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The research questions’ development and the research’s design, namely the choice of 
variables of study, were supported by the analysis of the theoretical and legal 
framework and previous empirical research, namely those suggesting that Credit 
Volume granted is constrained by Capital Requirements. The study was extended to the 
impact on the price of banking products, in order to understand the full associations 
with Loan Market Conditions.  
Despite each bank’s specificities, it was concluded that banks were not fulfilling all the 
reporting requirements on capital ratios. Moreover, if banks would have to meet the 
required capital ratios as of June 2011, all banks analyzed, except BPI, would need to 
increase Share Capital. On this respect, this project concluded that there is an 
association between Loan Market Conditions and Capital Requirements, more 
specifically in case Share Capital is increased, which suggests that shareholders are able 
to transfer to customers part of the costs derived from increasing capital, through 
decreasing the availability of loans to customers and protecting its Net Commercial 
Income by increasing the price of banking products. 
This project accomplishes the beginning of a study regarding relationships between 
some fundamental variables, namely Share Capital, Credit Volume and Net Commercial 
Income. Therefore, forthcoming research on the topic may use the database created by 
this research project, extending the analysis to more Portuguese banks. Additionally, it 
may also be expanded to other countries subject to Basel requirements and more years 
of study may be added. Furthermore, increases of Solvency may also be exploited 
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(+)Share Premium;  
(+)Legal reserves and retained earnings; 
(+)Net earnings from previous accounting periods
40
 and those from the previous exercise
41
;  
(+)Interim earnings from the current year;  
(+)Reserves of foreign currency translation and hedging of net investment in operating foreign unit;  
(+)Share of reserves and the results for deferred tax assets in extent that they are associated with losses as a negative element of Primary Capital; 
(-)Treasury shares;  
(-)Intangible assets;  
(-)Negative fair value reserve;  
(-)Share of reserves and the results for deferred tax liabilities in extent that they are associated with gains as a positive element of Primary Capital; 
(-)Positive revaluation differences arising from the application of the equity method sheet;  
(-)Value corresponding to weaknesses in the constitution of provisions in the terms set by BdP;  
(-)The amount of actuarial losses not yet recognized in the accounts; 
(-)Deferred costs; 
(-)Net profits resulting from the capitalization of future income from assets securitized, which improve the credit risk of the positions in the securitization; 
(+/-)Other instruments that may be approved by BdP. 
Complementary 
Own Funds  
(Tier 2 minus 
Deductions) 
(+)Elements consisting of the amounts actually realized, from the issuance of securities, in particular within indefinite maturity, and loans of non-graduates; 
(+)Elements capable of being freely used to cover risks; 
(+)Provisions for general credit risks up to a maximum of 1.25% of weighted assets; 
(+)Reserves from revaluation of fixed assets and other positive revaluation reserves; 
(+)Amounts of value adjustments and provisions exceeding the amount of losses expected for the same exposures, up to 0.6% weighted exposure risk; 
(+)Equity securities; 
(+)Contracts to formalize subordinated loans, which (1)establish an irrefutable presumption that in the event of in Solvency or liquidation of the borrower 
repayment, the lender is subject to the prior repayment of all non-subordinated creditors, (2)issue an original maturity of not less than 5 years, (3)does not contain 
any provision for early repayment over the term of maturity; 
(+)Paid-cumulative redeemable preference shares of a specified date; 
(-)Elements encompassed in all of the above, for the value in the balance sheet. 
                                                        
40
Earnings can only be considered for Own Funds’ composition if they have been determined in compliance with all applicable accounting standards, if they have been reduced by 
the expected value of taxes, dividends and other equivalent charges, computed in proportion to the period to which they refer, and if they have been certified by an auditor.  
41
The same as in footnote 35. 
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Appendix 2 – From Basel I to Basel III 
 Reasoning behind Goals Main Measures Criticism 
Basel 
I 
-Increase the safety and 
reliability of the 
international BS 
-Set a level playing field 




-Creates a system of bank asset classification 
-Imposes a minimum capital requirement rule (Tier 1 capital 
ratio of 4% and capital of 8%) 
-Non-OECD countries are assigned with a higher risk weight
i
 
-Low risk sensitiveness of its Capital Requirements leads to 
greater risk taking and regulatory capital arbitrage practices, 
supporting growth in securitization 
-Unable to distinguish quality of credits 
-Residual impact on the banks’ risk appetite decisions 








-Envision greater levels 
of disclosure and 








-Treats exposures very unequally depending on exposure 
characteristics -Treats banks very unevenly depending on 
sophistication of risk management systems, discouraging 
banks from lending to risky enterprises and encourage 
accumulating apparently risk-free assets, through the 




-Develop the ability to 
absorb shocks, making 
banks more capable to 
survive unexpected 
losses and less likely to 









Compel banks to act within four major axels in a phase-in 
process beginning in 2013 (full implementation by 2019): 
capital, surcharge, liquidity and leverage, namely: 
-Core Tier 1 capital ratio of 7% (including a 2.5% capital 
conservation buffer); 
-Incremental 0-2.5% countercyclical buffer in periods of 
excessive credit growth; 
-Tier 1 ratio of 8.5% (also including a 2.5% capital 
conservation buffer); 
-Systematically important FI should hold an additional 1.25% 
top quality capital of RWA; 
-The ratio of Core Tier 1 capital to a bank’s total assets must 
exceed 3%, with no risk adjustment; 
- Liquidity coverage ratio observation period starts in 2011, 
(minimum standards introduced in 2015); 
-Net stable funding ratio observation period will start in 2012 
(minimum standards introduced in 2018).  
-Increases banks’ marginal cost of capital 
-Studies estimate the major economies will be 3% smaller 
than they otherwise would be in 5 years and 7,5 million jobs 
will be sacrificed 
-Destroys any emerging economy recovery. 
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Appendix 3 – CMVM Regulation 





2 It establishes the delivery of a Corporate Governance Report, detailing about the company structure and corporate 







Companies should disclose information regarding capital structure, including shares not admitted to trading, and dividends 
policy, identifying the amount of dividend per share distributed in the past three exercises. Moreover, in the company’s 
website annual reports should be available, in addition with accountability documents, of at least the past 5 years. 
 
Appendix 4 – Own Funds’ decomposition in June 2011 
Total 
Amount
















%  of Own 
Funds
BCP €4,966.7 M 81,08% €5,441.0 M 88,83% €809.6 M 13,22% €-125.3 M -2,05% €6,125.3 M 100%
BES €5,445.0 M 71,23% €6,127.0 M 80,15% €1,564.0 M 20,46% €-47.0 M -0,61% €7,644.0 M 100%
BPI €2,387.9 M 87,82% €2,625.2 M 96,55% €294.7 M 10,84% €-200.9 M -7,39% €2,718.9 M 100%
CGD €6,770.1 M 73,38% €6,846.0 M 74,20% €2,421.0 M 26,24% €-41.0 M -0,44% €9,226.0 M 100%
Core Tier 1 Tier 1 Capital Tier 2 Capital Deductions Own Funds
 
Appendix 5 – Share Capital, Credit Volume and Net Commercial Income Evolution by Bank 
                                                        
 
(M €) J2004 2004 J2005 2005 J2006 2006 J2007 2007 J2008 2008 J2009 2009 J2010 2010 J2011
Share Capital 3.931,8 3.931,8 3.931,8 4.458,6 5.493,0 5.493,0 5.493,0 5.493,0 5.878,0 5.878,0 5.877,9 5.886,7 5.886,7 5.886,7 7.136,7
Credit Volume 49.900,0 50.793,0 52.465,0 52.909,0 53.857,0 56.670,0 60.341,0 65.650,0 69.534,0 72.372,0 72.583,0 75.191,0 75.920,0 73.905,0 71.453,0
Net Commercial Income 1.016,6 2.062,7 1.044,8 2.066,4 1.057,1 2.144,3 1.063,2 2.201,9 1.209,6 2.461,5 1.022,2 2.065,9 567,2 2.328,4 611,8
Share Capital 1.800,0 1.800,0 1.800,0 1.800,0 3.170,4 3.168,9 3.168,9 3.168,9 3.168,9 3.168,9 4.586,6 4.585,4 4.585,4 4.585,4 4.585,4
Credit Volume 27.311,2 27.715,3 29.297,7 30.832,1 32.926,8 34.882,5 38.232,7 42.170,3 44.878,9 47.049,5 47.275,5 48.978,8 51.673,6 50.829,1 49.717,9
Net Commercial Income 553,9 1.099,3 539,6 1.164,2 617,5 1.298,3 728,7 1.565,6 797,1 1.685,4 981,8 1.881,0 917,1 1.933,3 927,5
Share Capital 1.027,8 991,3 991,3 991,3 991,3 991,3 991,3 991,3 1.341,3 1.341,3 1.341,3 1.341,3 1.341,3 1.341,3 1.431,3
Credit Volume 18.242,8 18.999,1 19.648,4 20.963,2 22.201,9 24.630,1 26.892,7 27.230,5 28.524,6 29.275,2 29.023,4 29.955,6 30.546,2 30.055,0 29.121,1
Net Commercial Income 340,3 351,8 141,0 598,0 462,7 38,1 258,0 82,8 224,1 233,5 289,0 361,8 431,2 457,1 410,8
Share Capital 2.450,0 2.950,0 2.950,0 2.950,0 2.950,0 2.950,0 2.950,0 3.100,0 3.100,0 3.500,0 4.500,0 4.500,0 4.500,0 5.050,0 5.050,0
Credit Volume 44.903,0 46.888,8 49.507,6 49.935,9 52.192,0 57.268,3 60.508,0 66.844,3 69.546,2 75.311,2 76.788,1 77.222,0 80.018,1 81.907,2 82.393,7
Net Commercial Income 769.968,3 1.607.664,0 920.609,5 1.684.869,0 924.610,0 2.052.113,0 1.102.947,0 2.334.003,0 1.237.379,7 2.499.939,0 1.162.034,0 1.980.711,0 933.847,2 1.917.573,1 1.049.876,7
BCP
BES
BPI
CGD
